/posts/til/til-researchwhy-earths-long-evolution-hints-most-planets-never-finish
Why Earth’s Long Evolution Hints Most Planets Never Finish
When Evolution Looked Too Slow to Be Real Reading about Earth’s 4-billion-year slog from first life to intelligence, I kept bouncing between two stories: either evolution is gla...
When Evolution Looked Too Slow to Be Real
Reading about Earth’s 4-billion-year slog from first life to intelligence, I kept bouncing between two stories: either evolution is glacially slow, or we just got unlucky with a few big delays. The Bayesian work on evolutionary transitions forced me to confront a third option: the steps really are that slow, and the only reason we’re here to complain about it is that almost every other planet timed out. This flips the Fermi paradox from “where is everybody?” to “how did we get so far, at all?”
Background
These Bayesian analyses live at the intersection of astrobiology and statistics, mostly in the context of Earth’s 4.5-billion-year history within the Milky Way. They treat major evolutionary transitions—like the origin of life, complex cells, multicellularity, and intelligence—as a sequence of rare events that might also occur on other Earth-like planets. The scale is cosmic: billions of years of planetary habitability, compared against the roughly 10-billion-year main-sequence lifetimes of Sun-like stars and the even shorter lifetimes of more massive stars.
Bayesian Models of Evolutionary Bottlenecks
The basic move in these analyses is to treat the emergence of complex life as a sequence of rare transitions, each with its own characteristic timescale. Think of steps like: life arising at all, the jump to complex (eukaryotic) cells, the emergence of multicellularity, and finally technological intelligence. Each step is modeled as a stochastic waiting time—often something like an exponential or gamma distribution—with a rate parameter that says how intrinsically slow that step is on a typical Earth-like world.
The twist is that planets and stars don’t wait forever. A star’s habitable lifetime—the window during which a planet can support liquid water and stable conditions—is finite. For Sun-like stars, that’s on the order of 10 billion years; for many stars, it’s shorter. So for each step, the relevant question is not just “how long does it usually take?” but “how often does it finish before the habitable window slams shut?” If the expected time for a step is comparable to or longer than that window, then on most planets that step simply never completes.
Bayesian inference enters when we condition on what we actually observe: Earth took about 4 billion years to go from origin of life to technological civilization, and we find ourselves here before the Sun’s habitable window ends. The models ask: given a prior over how fast each step might be, what ranges of step durations are most consistent with this single, very biased data point? Counterintuitively, the answer is often that each step is intrinsically slow, with characteristic timescales that can be as long as or longer than a typical star’s habitable lifetime. Our existence then looks like a rare case where all the slow steps happened to complete in time.
The key trade-off is between two stories: either the steps are fast and Earth is typical, or the steps are slow and Earth is lucky. Because we must exist on a planet where all steps finished before the deadline, the Bayesian machinery tends to favor models where the underlying process is slow but we are sampling from the successful tail. That’s the part that feels backwards at first: the longer the observed durations, the more compatible they are with a universe where most planets never make it all the way through the sequence.
💡 Did you know: If you assume each evolutionary step is intrinsically slow, Earth’s timeline becomes typical rather than lucky—our 4+ billion years of waiting is exactly what you’d expect from a process with billion-year timescales.
A Minimal Bayesian Thought Experiment
Setup:
- Suppose there are 3 critical evolutionary steps.
- Each step i has an exponential waiting time with rate λ_i (mean time 1/λ_i).
- A planet's habitable window is T_hab (e.g., 10 billion years).
Model:
1. Draw λ_1, λ_2, λ_3 from some prior (e.g., broad log-uniform over many orders of magnitude).
2. For each step i, draw a waiting time t_i ~ Exp(λ_i).
3. Compute total time to intelligence: T_total = t_1 + t_2 + t_3.
4. If T_total > T_hab, that planet never produces intelligent observers.
5. Condition on "we observe a planet where T_total ≈ 4.5 Gyr and T_total < T_hab".
Observation:
- When you run this simulation (or do the math analytically),
the posterior over λ_i often shifts toward *small* λ (i.e., *slow* steps),
because we are, by construction, only looking at the rare planets where
all slow steps happened to finish before T_hab.
- Long observed durations are not evidence against slow steps; they are
exactly what you expect to see in the rare success cases.
The Insight
Once you account for finite habitable lifetimes and the fact that we can only observe successful planets, Earth’s long evolutionary delays are actually evidence for intrinsically slow steps, not against them. In such models, most planets never complete the full sequence of transitions to intelligent life before their habitable window closes.
🧠 Bonus: In these models, the fact that we exist now, rather than earlier or later, acts like a selection effect that heavily shapes the inferred speed of each step—anthropic bias is not a philosophical flourish, it’s a parameter constraint.
Gotchas
- Treating Earth’s rapid early biogenesis as evidence that all steps are fast → leads to overestimating the prevalence of complex life → because later, much slower transitions dominate the total waiting time and are easy to overlook.
- Ignoring the finite habitable window of stars and planets → makes slow steps look harmless → but in reality, if a step’s expected time exceeds the habitable window, most planets will time out before completing it.
- Forgetting the observer selection effect (we can only observe planets where all steps finished in time) → biases you toward thinking the process is generally efficient → when in fact you’re sampling from the rare success tail.
- Assuming all steps share the same timescale without checking sensitivity → hides which specific transitions are true bottlenecks → and can make the whole process look either implausibly fast or implausibly slow.
Takeaways
- Model evolutionary milestones as explicit stochastic waiting times with a finite habitable deadline, not as vague historical anecdotes.
- Treat our 4-billion-year timeline as data that is heavily filtered by observer selection, not as a typical sample from all planets.
- Expect that intrinsically slow steps can still be consistent with our existence; we are observing from the rare subset of worlds where all slow steps finished in time.
- When thinking about the Fermi paradox, separate the question “are steps slow?” from “did they happen here?”—Bayesian conditioning couples them in non-obvious ways.
- If you want to change the conclusion, change the priors or the habitable window assumptions explicitly, and check how sensitive the posterior is to those choices.
🔥 One more thing: Under reasonable priors, the math often says that most habitable planets never get past the earliest transitions at all, meaning the universe could be full of sterile or microbially-inhabited worlds that never reach complex life.
References
- The Timing of Evolutionary Transitions Suggests Intelligent Life Is Rare (article)
- Bayesian Analysis of the Great Filter (article)
- The Timing of Evolutionary Transitions on Earth (article)